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Abstract: 
In this article, we have proposed a blind, fragile and Region of Interest (ROI) lossless 
medical image watermarking (MIW) technique, providing an all-in-one solution tool to 
various medical data distribution and management issues like security, content 
authentication, safe archiving, controlled access retrieval and captioning etc. The 
proposed scheme combines lossless data compression and encryption technique to 
embed electronic health record (EHR)/DICOM metadata, image hash, indexing 
keyword, doctor identification code and tamper localization information in the medical 
images. Extensive experiments (both subjective and objective) were carried out to 
evaluate performance of the proposed MIW technique. The findings offer suggestive 
evidence that the proposed MIW scheme is an effective all-in-one solution tool to 
various issues of medical information management domain. Moreover, given its relative 
simplicity, the proposed scheme can be applied to the medical images to serve in many 
medical applications concerned with privacy protection, safety, and management etc. 
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1. Introduction 
edical information is highly 
valuable and critical due to its 
importance in clinical diagnosis, 
treatment, research, education and 
other commercial/non-commercial 
applications, both for private and 
government organizations. During the last few 
years, due to the rapid and significant 
advancements of information and 
communication technologies medical data 
distribution and management systems have 
undergone a significant change, both in 
concepts as well as in applications. Hospital 
Information System (HIS) and Picture 
Archiving and Communication Systems 
(PACS) based on The Digital Imaging and 
Communications in Medicine (DICOM) 
standard (as advised by National Electrical 
Manufacturers Association (NEMA)), form 
the base of the modern integrated and 
sophisticated health-care delivery systems [1]. 
These systems provide easier access, effective 
manipulation and efficient distribution of 
medical information between hospitals. There 
are number of reasons for this medical 
information exchange, for example 
telemedicine applications (ranging from tele-
consulting, tele-diagnosis and tele-surgery 
etc.) to distant learning of medical personnel 
[2]. Electronic health record (EHR) 
technology has replaced the inefficient paper 
records paradigm and is available in various 
forms such as diagnostic reports, images and 
vital sign signals etc. It can also contain the 
health history information of a patient, such as 
demographic data, physical examination 
information, laboratory test results, treatment 
procedures, and prescriptions etc. which are 
highly confidential in nature [3]. 
On the other hand, these advances have 
introduced new risks for inappropriate use of 
medical information, given the ease with 
which digital form of data could be 
manipulated. Moreover, medical images have 
special characteristics and requirements. As 
well as, it is also concerned with legal and 
ethical issues regarding the allowable 
operations and disclosures that can be 
undertaken on them, since any degradation of 
the quality of the images could result in 
misdiagnosis [4, 5]. Therefore, it is of 
paramount importance to prevent unauthorized 
access and manipulation of medical data, as 
well as to protect its confidentiality. These 
result in a need to design a system for 
effective storage, controlled restriction of 
manipulation and access of medical 
information, keeping the authenticity, integrity 
and confidentiality requirements of medical 
data intact for effective management [4-7]. 
Digital watermarking (DWM) which 
imperceptibly embeds information 
(watermark) within a host signal (cover) such 
as image, audio or video, is an emerging 
research technique for multimedia data 
management [8]. Original motivation of this 
technique was to protect copyright, but it has 
also been applied to a wide range of 
multimedia applications [9, 10]. When it is 
applied to medical images, necessary steps are 
taken so that after watermark embedding, 
medical images can still conform to the 
DICOM format [11]. DWM techniques have 
the potentiality of becoming an all-in-one 
solution tool providing alternative and/or 
complementary solutions for a wide number of 
issues related to medical information 
management and distribution [4-7]. 
Many medical image watermarking schemes 
were proposed during the last few years [11-
29]. In [13] Chao et al. have proposed a secure 
data-hiding technique based on the bipolar 
multiple-base conversion to allow a variety of 
EHR data to be hidden within the same mark 
image. This is different from the conventional 
encryption methods in which information or 
digital signatures are appended to the message 
separately. Two schemes of interleaving 
patient information (text and graphical signal) 
in medical images were proposed by Acharya 
et al. [14, 16]. In [14], the authors have 
showed that reliability of transmission and 
storage of medical images interleaved with 
patient information by least significant bit 
(LSB) plane replacement scheme, over noisy 
channel can be enhanced using suitable error 
correction techniques.  The other technique 
proposed by Acharya et al. in [16] is based on 
interleaving the texts and graphical signals in 
the last bits of discrete cosine transform 
(DCT) coefficients from the middle frequency 
M  Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  3 
range onwards. The blind MIW method 
described in [17] by Zain et al., is reversible 
and is used for authentication of DICOM 
images with good imperceptibility. This 
scheme is based on Region of Interest (ROI) 
and works in spatial domain. Woo et al. have 
proposed a multiple watermark method for 
privacy control and tamper detection in 
medical images with good imperceptibility 
[18]. In this scheme, an annotation watermark 
consisting encrypted patient information and a 
digital signature of the medical practitioner is 
embedded into the border pixels of images by 
discrete wavelet transform (DWT) based 
robust watermarking method. For integrity 
checking and tamper detection a tiled fragile 
binary watermark pattern is embedded in the 
LSB plane. In [21], Wu et al. have proposed 
two block based schemes for tamper detection 
and recovery using an adaptive robust 
watermarking technique with the modulo 
operation. Guo et al. have proposed a region 
based lossless MIW method for security 
enhancement and authentication using 
difference expansion of adjacent pixel values 
in [22]. This scheme does not introduce any 
embedding-induced distortion in ROI. In [23], 
Guo et al. have incorporated tamper 
localization capability to their previous 
method of [22] by partitioning an image into 
certain non-overlapping regions and 
appending the associated local authentication 
information directly into the watermark 
payload. A contextual based transform domain 
MIW technique is proposed in [25] by 
Nambakhsh et al. to embed electrocardiograph 
(ECG) and demographic text data as double 
watermark in PET images. Extensive review 
on different MIW schemes can be found in 
[6,7,29]. 
The present paper aims to reveal the potentials 
of digital watermarking in medical data 
management issues and proposes a novel 
method to enforce integrity, authenticity and 
confidentiality of the medical information, by 
embedding two different fragile watermarks in 
the last two least significant bit-planes of the 
medical image. Even though, there exist 
several medical image watermarking 
techniques, but most of them have several 
disadvantages: some of them are task and 
modality specific, whereas others suffer from 
the problem of low security, imperceptibility, 
payload capacity and without tamper 
localization capability etc. A comparative 
analysis of the advantages/disadvantages of 
the proposed technique over several state-of-
the-art MIW schemes is given in Section 4 of 
this article. The proposed MIW method is 
modality and task independent, having high 
imperceptibility and payload capacity. The 
proposed scheme is highly secure having 
several layers of security mechanisms. 
Watermarking by combining lossless data 
compression and encryption techniques, 
scattered embedding of the watermark bits in 
the embedding region, use of binary location 
map for the novel tamper localization method, 
all these aspects make the proposed scheme an 
effective novel MIW technique. Moreover, the 
proposed scheme can be used as an all-in-one 
solution tool, which makes it a novel 
technique in the medical image management 
domain. The proposed method conforms to the 
strict specifications and requirements 
regarding medical data handling by preserving 
their visual/information quality and diagnostic 
value.  
1.1. Medical Image Watermarking: 
Requirements 
Due to the special characteristics derived from 
strict ethics, legislative and diagnostic 
implications - integrity protection, 
confidentiality and prevention of unauthorized 
manipulation of medical information is very 
important. The risks are increased, when 
dealing with an open environment like the 
internet. This imposes three mandatory 
characteristics: confidentiality, reliability and 
availability [4]. 
•  Confidentiality imposes that only the 
entitled users, in the normally scheduled 
conditions, have access to the information. 
•  Reliability has two different aspects : 
o  Integrity: the information has not 
been modified by non-authorized 
persons, and 
o  Authentications: a proof that the 
information belongs indeed to the 
correct patient and is issued from 
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•  Availability is the ability of an information 
system to be used by the entitled users in 
the normal scheduled conditions of access 
and exercise. 
Another key requirement is that, the medical 
image should not undergo any degradation 
that will affect the diagnosis from the image. 
Generally, medical images are required to 
remain intact to achieve this with no visible 
alteration to their original form. The strict 
specifications and requirements regarding the 
quality of the medical images could be met by 
lossless (reversible, invertible, distortion free, 
erasable etc.) watermarking, which has the 
capability to recover the exact original content 
from a watermarked image [24, 30, 31]. 
Selective regions watermarking by the 
selection of regions of interest (ROIs) is 
another alternative procedure. Here ROIs are 
left intact by the embedding procedure and the 
rest of the image - the regions of non-interest 
(RONIs) are used for watermark embedding. 
Of course, the watermarked image is not 
distortion free, but the distorted image is used 
only as a carrier for data to be embedded and 
not for diagnosis. The losslessly recovered 
image is the final one for diagnosis [12, 15, 
22, 24]. We have followed a similar approach 
in this paper, where the whole image including 
ROI and RONI is used to embed the 
watermark. If there is no modification in the 
watermarked image then the method can 
completely recover the ROI of the image to 
their original form. 
1.2 Medical Image Watermarking: 
Applications 
A brief outline of MIW applications in 
medical data management domain is as 
follows [4, 6, 19] 
1.2.1 Saving Memory 
At present, medical images and the 
corresponding medical information related to 
the patient (EHR) are stored separately. 
Memory space requirement for the image and 
the patient record is very voluptuous and 
rapidly increasing. Embedding the data in the 
corresponding images will save a lot of 
memory, as the image and the data become a 
single entity after watermarking. 
1.2.2 Avoid Detachment 
As the medical images and related medical 
records are stored separately, the chances of 
corruption of these records or their detachment 
from the images are very high. Misplacing a 
data from its corresponding medical image 
may lead to a fiasco. Applying watermarking, 
this separate data can be embedded into the 
corresponding medical image, thus reducing 
the risk of detachment. 
1.2.3 Saving Bandwidth 
Transmission bandwidth is a valuable asset in 
network application. Since the EHR and the 
medical image are integrated into one by 
MIW, bandwidth for the transmission can be 
reduced in telemedicine applications. 
1.2.4 Confidentiality and Security 
Confidentiality and security of patient record, 
is of utmost importance in medical data 
management and distribution domain. 
Imperceptibility and key dependency of MIW 
with advanced encryption techniques can 
provide solutions to these problems. 
1.2.5 Controlling Integrity 
Fragile watermark is used for integrity 
verification and tamper localization [32]. As 
the integrity of medical data (images, records) 
is of paramount importance, fragile 
watermarking technique can be used in this 
scenario. Fragile MIW techniques, allow us to 
evaluate the extent of tampering, localization 
of the modified regions, and help us to 
determine whether the data are trustworthy for 
use or not [20]. 
1.2.6 Authentication 
Combined with cryptographic techniques, 
MIW provides a means of identity 
authentication, by embedding the encrypted 
version of the physician's or clinician's digital 
signature (DS) or identification code, in the 
medical image. To obtain the original data, 
knowledge of both encryption technique and 
watermark keys are required, which provides 
more complete protection [11, 13]. 
1.2.7 Indexing 
Watermark can also play the role of keywords 
or indices (e.g., USG-LA), based on which 
effective archiving and retrieval from querying 
mechanism could take place. PACS nowadays    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  5 
 
Fig. 1 – Hash of the ROI using SHA-256. 
retrieve images through indexing. Patient 
demographics, image acquisition 
characteristics, diagnostic codes etc. can be 
used as the indices or keywords. This can also 
eliminate the extra storage and transmission 
bandwidth requirements. 
1.2.8 Controlling Access 
In MIW, EHR/DICOM metadata are 
embedded in the image in such a way that 
gives permanency and more protection than in 
the case of simple metadata. This is because; 
access to them is only possible through the use 
of proper key. In this way, MIW has the 
potential of becoming an alternative access 
control mechanism, since different keys might 
reveal different information [4, 33]. 
1.2.9 Captioning 
Caption or annotation watermarks can be used 
for providing additional valuable information 
about the patient's report. ROIs in a medical 
image can be highlighted through descriptive 
watermarks for future reference, physicians' 
guidance or teaching of medical personnel. 
The above discussion shows, the potentialities 
of MIW as an all-in-one solution tool, and also 
describes the strict requirements of the 
medical image management paradigm. A 
novel MIW system with the potentialities and 
maintaining the strict requirements mentioned 
above is described next.  
2. Methods 
We have used some standard tools, like SHA-
256, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
and arithmetic coding in our proposed scheme. 
SHA-256 is used to compute the hash of the 
ROI of the medical image. This hash is used 
as a message digest to verify the integrity of 
the medical image.  In our algorithm, AES 
cryptographic method is used to 
encrypt/decrypt the EHR/DICOM metadata 
part to achieve better security. To reduce the 
payload's size we losslessly compressed the 
watermark using arithmetic coding. 
2.1 Hash of the Region of Interest (ROI) 
The ROI is the most important part in a 
medical image. It contains the most valuable 
information of the medical image and should 
not undergo any modification. There can be 
several disjoint ROIs in a medical image and 
several ways exist to define the ROI in a 
medical image: manual, automatic and semi-
automatic. In the standard DICOM format if 
the ROI is present then its description is 
embedded in a tag of the DICOM header. In 
the proposed scheme, a polygonal ROI can be 
defined by the user (physician, clinician etc.) 
interactively. The reason of choosing 
polygonal ROI is that in most of the cases ROI 
in a medical image is irregularly shaped. A 
polygonal ROI, can be completely 
characterized by the number of vertices nv and 
their coordinates v(x, y). Although, we only 
have concentrated on single ROI, the proposed 
method can also work on multiple ROIs. After 
the selection of the ROI, the hash of the ROI is 
computed using the SHA-256 cryptographic 
hash function, which produces a 64 character 
(256 bits) message digest as shown in Fig. 1.   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  6 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Dispersion of the watermark bits for k = 23, n = 100 and h = 50. 
2.2 Dispersion of the Watermark Bits 
To increase the security of the proposed 
scheme, we take the help of a one-to-one 
mapping function, which depends on a secret 
prime key and disperses the bit values of the 
watermark payload into the embedding region. 
For example, one function that may be used 
for this purpose is given below: 
f(x) = (kx mod n) + 1 (1) 
where, for an image of size P × Q and 
watermark payload of h bits, 
n = P × Q; 
k = prime number є [1, n]; 
x = bit position in the watermark payload and 
x є [1, h]. 
As an example, if we take k = 23, n = 100 (say 
10 × 10 pixels image) and h = 50, then the 
dispersion of the bits of the watermark in the 
image is going to be like Fig. 2. 
2.3 Tamper Localization 
We have used a novel image content 
dependent block based tamper localization 
method in the proposed MIW technique. 
Considering Bp as the LSB plane of the 
image, after embedding the first watermark in 
the penultimate LSB plane (say Bp+1), the 
LSB plane Bp of the watermarked image is 
filled with 0s. The modified watermarked 
image of size P × Q is then divided into 3 × 3 
blocks in a non-overlapping manner. If the 
image size is not a multiple of 3, then some 
more rows and/or columns with all values 0 
are added to the image to get an extended 
image. A binary location map (BLM) of the 
same size as the image or the extended image 
is formed for tamper localization purpose. For 
every 3 × 3 image block a 9 bits block 
identification code (BIC) is calculated using a 
cryptographic hash function. For example if 
we use SHA-256, for a block we will get a 
BIC of 256 bits. Among these 256 bits, 9 bits 
are selected. The selection of 9 bits among 256 
bits is same for both the watermark insertion 
and extraction procedures. This selection of 9 
bits also provides a level of security. The 
BLM constructed by all the block’s BICs, is 
embedded in the LSB plane Bp of the 
modified watermarked image. Considering, a 
3 × 3 image block as an example, Fig. 3, 
describes this method. In this example, we 
have used SHA-256 to compute the BIC of the 
block. We have chosen the 1
st, 28
th, 56
th, 84
th, 
112
th, 140
th, 168
th, 196
th and 224
th bits as the 
selected 9 bits out of the 256 bits to construct 
the BIC. The Block 1 in the Fig. 3 is the image 
after embedding the first watermark in the 
Bp+1 bitplane of the original image. After 
setting the LSB (Bp) plane of the Block 1 to 0, 
the Block 2 will always contains only even 
numbers. In this case, only the odd numbers of 
the Block 1 will be reduced to next lower even 
numbers. SHA-256 hashing is used on Block 2 
to get the 256 bits unique hash code as shown 
in the Fig. 3. Among these 256 bits only 9 bits 
are selected to form the BIC (Block 3 in Fig. 
3). The selected bits are shown in red colour in 
the Fig. 3. This BIC is used to construct the 
BLM. The BP plane of the Block 2 (which 
only contains 0) is replaced by this BIC (BLM 
for the whole image) to get the final 
watermarked image (Block 4 in Fig. 3.). 
Replacing the Bp plane of Block 2 by the BIC 
(Block 3) bits will change the pixel values of 
Block 2 in the following manner: if the bit at 
the (i, j)th position of BIC (Block 3) is 1 then    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  7 
 
Fig. 3 – Embedding of the tamper localization information. (For interpretation of the 
references to color in text, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
 
Fig. 4 – Tamper localization in case of no tampering. 
 
Fig. 5 – Tamper localization in case of tampering (shaded pixels). 
increase the (i, j)th pixel value of Block 2 by 1 
to the next higher odd value. For example, the 
BIC (Block 3) shown in Fig. 3, contains 1 bit 
at (2,2) and (3,2) positions. Therefore, only the 
pixel values 68 and 78 at the corresponding 
positions (2,2) and (3,2) of Block 2 are 
increased by 1 to the next higher odd values 
69 and 79, respectively. 
During watermark extraction procedure, the 
LSB plane Bp (Block 4 in Figs. 4-5) from the 
watermarked image (Block 1 in Figs. 4-5) is 
extracted. Following the same procedure as    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  8 
 
Fig. 6 – First watermark WMEMB generation and insertion.
described above, a BIC/BLM is formed (Block 
3 in Figs. 4-5). If there is no tampering to the 
watermarked image (Block 1 in Fig. 4), then 
the extracted bit-plane (Block 4 in Fig. 4) and 
the BIC/BLM (Block 3 in Fig. 4) are going to 
be same as shown in the Fig. 4. Fig. 5 shows 
that for any modification in the watermarked 
image (shaded pixels are the modified pixels 
of Block 1 in Fig. 5), the extracted bit-plane 
(Block 4 in Fig. 5) and the BIC/BLM (Block 3 
in Fig. 5) is not going to be same. The 
difference between the extracted bit-plane and 
the BLM, will give the tampered locations. 
2.4 Watermark Generation and Insertion 
Two different watermarks are embedded in the 
medical images in our proposed method. The 
first watermark is used to insert the encrypted 
EHR/DICOM metadata, indexing keywords, 
Doctor’s identification code, ROI information 
and the side information used during the 
watermark extraction procedure. The ROI 
information consists of the number of vertices 
nv and their corresponding coordinates v(x, y) 
of the polygonal ROI. It also contains the bits 
of the LSB planes Bp and Bp+1 of the ROI.  
The second watermark consists of the binary 
location map, used for tamper localization. 
During embedding the first 524 bits of the first 
watermark is used as the side information. The 
watermark insertion procedure is described as 
follows: 
Inputs: Original Image (OI) of size P × Q, 
EHR/DICOM metadata (PI), Secret Key (KS), 
nv, v(x, y), Index (IDX), Doctor’s Identification 
Code (DIC) and Side Information (SI). 
Outputs: Watermarked image (WMI). 
Steps: 
1.  Separate OI, into ROI and RONI. 
2.  Compute the message digest HASHROI of 
ROI, using SHA-256. 
3.  Assuming,  BP1_ROI  and  BP2_ROI 
represents the bit-planes of the ROI, 
numbered  Bp  and  Bp  + 1 respectively. 
Represent the pixels of BP1_ROI  and 
BP2_ROI, as binary strings BINBP1 and 
BINBP2 respectively. 
4.  Change  BINBP1 and BINBP2 to their 
hexadecimal representations as HEXBP1 
and HEXBP2. 
5.  Encrypt  PI  using  KS  by Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) method to get 
PIENCRY. 
6.  Create the binary string representation of 
PIENCRY as BIN_PIENCRY.   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  9 
7.  Represent  BIN_PIENCRY  to its equivalent 
hexadecimal form as HEX_PIENCRY. 
8.  Concatenate  nv,  v(x, y),  IDX,  DIC, 
HASHROI,  HEXBP1,  HEXBP2 and 
HEX_PIENCRY to get WMCONCAT. 
9.  Compress WMCONCAT losslessly to WMCOM 
using arithmetic coding compression 
technique. 
10. Concatenate  WMCOM  and the binary 
representation of side information SI  to 
WMEMB, which is the first watermarked to 
be embedded in the Bp + 1 bit-plane. 
11. Embed the bits of WMEMB in the Bp + 1 
bit-plane of OI using the method described 
in Section 2.2, to get the modified image 
WMI1. 
12. If the size of WMI1 is not a multiple of 3, 
then modify it as described in Section 2.3, 
and set all the bits of the LSB plane Bp of 
WMI1 to zero to get a modified image 
WMI1MOD. 
13. Divide WMI1MOD into B number of 3 × 3 
non-overlapping blocks: 
BLOCK_IMb = {block_imb(i, j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 
3}, 
where, block_imb(i, j) є 0, 1, 2, ...., 2
L - 1, 
14. For each block BLOCK_IMb, compute its 
block identification code :  
BICb = BIT_SEL(HASH(BLOCK_IMb)),  
where,  b  є  1,  2,  3, ...., B;  HASH(·) 
represents the cryptographic hash function 
used, and BIT_SEL(·) indicates the 9 bits 
selection procedure out of 256 bits. 
Create the final binary location map 
(BLM)  using the method described as 
follows: 
BLM = {BICb, b є 1, 2, 3, ...., B} 
15. Obtain the final watermarked image WMI, 
by replacing the LSB plane Bp  of 
WMI1MOD by BLM. If the size of WMI1 is 
increased to get WMI1MOD  during 
watermark embedding, then reduce the 
size of WMI to the original image size by 
deleting the added rows and/or columns 
from WMI. 
Fig. 6, describes the generation procedure of 
WMEMB. 
2.5 Watermark Extraction and Verification 
The salient steps of the extraction and 
verification process can be enumerated as 
follows: 
Inputs: Watermarked and possibly attacked 
image (WMI´) of size P × Q, Secret Key KS. 
Outputs: Authenticity result (AUTHRES) 
and/or Watermark extracted image (WMIEXI), 
PI, IDX, DIC. 
Steps: 
1.  Using the same function (as Equ. (1)) used 
for watermark insertion, with proper key k, 
extract the bit string representation of the 
embedded watermark, from the bit-plane 
Bp  + 1 of WMI´. Let it be denoted by 
WMEXT. 
2.  Divide WMEXT into two parts. One as the 
side information SI  (first 524 bits from 
WMEXT) and the rest as WMCOM. 
3.  Decompress  WMCOM  using arithmetic 
coding with the help of SI to WMCONCAT. 
4.  Separate nv, v(x, y), IDX, DIC, HASHROI, 
HEXBP1,  HEXBP2 and HEX_PIENCRY  from 
WMCONCAT. 
5.  Using  nv  and coordinates v(x, y) 
information, the proposed scheme 
automatically specify the ROI in WMI´. 
6.  Convert HEXBP1, HEXBP2 to their bit string 
representations as BINBP1 and BINBP2, 
respectively. 
7.  Replace the bits of the Bp and Bp + 1 bit-
planes in the ROI of WMI´ by the bits of 
BINBP1 and BINBP2, respectively. 
8.  Calculate the hash HashROI_EXT of the ROI 
of WMI´ using SHA-256. 
9.  Extract the Bp  bit-plane of WMI´  as 
BLMEXT.   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  10 
 
Fig. 7 – Watermark extraction and verification.
10. Set all the bits of the Bp bit-plane of WMI´ 
to 0 to get a modified image as WMI´MOD. 
11. Compute the binary location map (BLM) 
from the WMI´MOD using the steps 12 to 15 
described in Section 2.4. 
12. To get the authenticity result (AUTHRES) 
follow the next procedure: 
if  HASHROI  =  HashROI_EXT  and  BLM  = 
BLMEXT then 
AUTHRES = True 
Do steps 13 to 15 
else 
AUTHRES = False 
Do step 16 
end if 
13. Convert  HEX_PIENCRY  to its equivalent 
binary string representation as 
BIN_PIENCRY. 
14. Change  BIN_PIENCRY  to its original 
representation as PIENCRY. 
15. Decrypt PIENCRY using KS by AES method 
to get PI. 
16. Find the difference between BLM  and 
BLMEXT to get the tampered regions. 
The block diagram of the watermark 
extraction and verification process is shown in 
Fig. 7. 
3. Results 
We implemented the proposed MIW technique 
in MATLAB. Experiments were done on a PC 
with 2.66 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM. 430 
medical images of 7 different modalities (CT, 
MRI, USG, X-ray, Barium Study, 
Mammogram etc.), various sizes, file formats 
(BMP, TIF, GIF, DICOM), and bit-depths (8, 
12, 16) were used to test our proposed scheme. 
Among these 430 images, 140 images were of 
size 128 × 128 pixels, 140 images were of size 
256 × 256 pixels and 140 images were of size 
512 × 512 pixels. Each of the 7 different 
modalities had 60 images individually. So, 
each modality of medical images consisted of 
20 images of size 128 × 128, 256 × 256 and 
512 × 512 pixels separately. The rest 10 
images were DICOM images having different 
sizes and bit-depths. EHR of different sizes 
were used in the experiments. Fig. 8 shows an 
example of the EHR used in the experiment. 
To show the effectiveness of the proposed 
technique, subjective as well as quantitative 
analysis were carried out. We used Peak 
Signal-to-Noise Ration (PSNR) and Weighted 
PSNR (WPSNR) to measure the distortion 
produced after watermark embedding. Higher 
value of PSNR and WPSNR indicates less    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  11 
 
Fig. 8 – An example of HER used in the experiment. 
distortion in the watermarked image. Mean 
Structural SIMilarity index (MSSIM) was 
used to measure the similarity between the 
original image and the watermarked image 
[34]. MSSIM value 1 indicates that the images 
are similar. Visual degradation was 
quantitatively measured using the Total 
Perceptual Error (TPE) measurement 
calculated from the Watson Metric [35]. 
Lower the value of TPE the better the result.  
An expert clinician was asked to subjectively 
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
MIW method. Some of the medical images 
used in the experiment are shown in the Fig. 9, 
with their corresponding intensity histograms. 
It also shows the corresponding watermarked 
and watermark extracted medical images. 
Table 1, shows the result of watermark 
insertion in terms of the used quantitative 
measures in average. The results given in the 
Table 1, denotes the average results obtained 
by watermarking the 60 test images for that 
particular modality of image. Table 2, shows 
the results for 3 DICOM images among the 10 
different test DICOM images with different 
modality, size and bit-depth. The graph of the 
Fig 10, shows that relationship between ROI 
data size and watermarking payload. The 
performance of the proposed MIW scheme 
was compared with several state-of-the-art 
existing MIW techniques and the findings are 
given in the Table 3. The Fig. 11, describes 
the tamper localization capability of the 
proposed MIW technique. 
4. Discussion 
During the subjective evaluation of the 
performance of the proposed MIW scheme, 
original, watermarked and watermark 
extracted images obtained by the proposed 
method were shown to an expert clinician. He 
was asked to classify the images shown to 
them into different category: original, 
watermarked and watermark extracted. He 
agreed with our claim that it was impossible to 
distinguish the original, watermarked and 
watermark extracted images. He found no 
significant visual difference between the 
original, watermarked and watermark 
extracted medical images, which suggests that 
there was no noticeable visual and/or 
informational degradation in the watermarked 
and watermark extracted images. The clinician 
was also asked to evaluate the proposed MIW 
scheme for its usability. He confirmed that the 
proposed MIW system is easy to use and 
described the system as a quality product, 
which satisfies the strict ethical and legislative 
requirements of medical information 
paradigm. The images of the Fig. 9, indicates 
that the visual degradation caused by 
watermark insertion and extraction cannot be 
identified easily. The intensity histograms of 
Fig. 9, also supports the low visual 
degradation caused by the proposed technique, 
as the intensity histograms of the watermarked 
and watermark extracted images, are very 
similar to the intensity histograms of the 
original images. 
We also evaluated the proposed MIW scheme 
to measure its watermark capacity. As    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  12 
 
Fig. 9 – Sample medical images used in the experiment (a) original images, (b) watermarked 
images, (c) watermark extracted images. 
mentioned earlier, the second watermark is the 
binary location map, having the same size of 
the corresponding image. Since the second 
watermark is solely used for tamper 
localization purpose, it should not be included 
in the computation of watermark payload. 
Only the first watermark can be of different 
sizes. The fixed 524 bits needed for SI were 
also not considered in the watermark payload 
computation.  In this experiment we 
considered different sizes ROIs (5% to 30% of 
the original image's pixels). The bits needed 
for two bitplanes (Bp and Bp+1) of ROI were 
excluded in the watermark payload 
calculation.  Then we calculated how much 
other information (EPR, Hash of ROI, DIC 
etc.) can be embedded in the medical image 
keeping in mind the imperceptibility 
requirement of MIW. Considering an image of 
size P x Q pixels and a ROI of size Y% of the 
whole image, the watermarking capacity is 
approximately (PQ(100-2Y)-52400)/100PQ 
bpp
2. In other words, the results given in the 
Table 1, indicates the highest visual 
degradation considering the maximum 
possible watermarking payload. The results 
shown in Table 1 are of the watermark  
                                                            
2 Number of bits needed for 2 bitplanes of ROI = 
2PQY/100 bits, 
Number of bits available for information (EPR, HASH, 
DIC etc.) insertion = PQ ‐ 524 ‐ (2PQY/100) bits, 
Watermarking payload capacity = {PQ(100 ‐ 2Y) ‐ 
52400}/(100PQ) bpp   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  13 
Table 1 - Performance of the proposed MIW scheme. 
Image Modality  Average PSNR  Average WPSNR  Average MSSIM  Average TPE 
Abdomen CT  43.5219  45.2290  0.9527  0.0635 
Barium Study  44.8029  45.8453  0.9786  0.0322 
Brain MRI  43.6067  45.5822  0.9486  0.0649 
Chest X-ray  44.3848  45.4122  0.9891  0.0250 
Head CT  44.0263  45.6086  0.9635  0.0542 
Mammogram  43.0897  43.6464  0.8707  0.0923 
USG  43.8484  45.4997  0.9751  0.0419 
extracted images. It is clear from the Table 1 
that the proposed method works well for all 
the different modalities of medical images. 
Furthermore, it is referred in [36], medical 
image distortion should be maintained in the 
range of 40 to 50 dB (PSNR value). The 
PSNR and WPSNR values in Table 1, are well 
over 40 dB, which indicates that the distortion 
in the watermark extracted images is low, 
considering the maximum possible watermark 
payload. The average MSSIM values for all 
the modalities of medical images are near 
about 1. This indicates that the perceived 
change in structural information in the 
watermark extracted images is insignificant, 
and that these are similar to the original un-
watermarked images. The low average TPE 
values show that the proposed MIW scheme 
causes low visual degradation in the 
watermark extracted images. 
Table 2 - Performance of the proposed scheme for DICOM images. 
Image Modality  Size & Bit-depths  Average 
PSNR 
Average 
WPSNR 
Average 
MSSIM 
Average 
TPE 
MR-Shoulder  1024 X 1024, 12  43.0234  44.2318  0.9192  0.0619 
CT-Abdomen  512 X 512, 8  42.1649  43.1469  0.8096  0.0634 
MR-Knee  253 X 256, 16  43.9823  44.0346  0.9904  0.0102 
As DICOM (Digital Imaging and 
Communications in Medicine) is the 
international standard for handling, storing, 
printing, and transmitting information in 
medical imaging, we also experimented with 
several DICOM images of different 
modalities, having different size and bit-
depths. In those experiments we first extracted 
the metadata part of the DICOM data and then 
embedded this information into the medical 
images. Table 2, shows the performance of the 
proposed MIW scheme in watermarking 
DICOM images. The results given in the 
Table 2, shows the performance of the 
watermark extracted images. In this 
experiment, the same experimental setup was 
used as of for the non-DICOM images. It is 
obvious from the results of Table 2 that our 
proposed method also performs efficiently for 
DICOM images. 
The graph of the Fig. 10, shows there exists an 
inverse relationship between ROI size and 
watermarking payload. We can see from the 
given graph of Fig. 10, that for low ROI size 
(5% of original image's pixels), the proposed 
MIW scheme have achieved watermarking   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  14 
payload of approximately 0.89 bpp, and that of 
for 30% ROI is approximately 0.39 bpp. The 
watermarking payload decreases 
approximately 10% with 5% increase in the 
ROI size. For example, for a 512 x 512 
medical image (today's digital medical images 
often have high resolution) considering a ROI 
with 30% of total image pixels, the proposed 
technique can embed approximately 12kb 
information (near about 14500 characters 
considering 7 bits ASCII characters). 
Decreasing the ROI size to 5% of the total 
image pixels, the amount of embedded 
information increase to approximately 28kb. 
This amount of information is enough for 
modern EHR data. It should also be noted that 
in most of the cases in real life, the size of the 
watermark payload is much less than the 
maximum available embedding payload 
capacity. Therefore, in those cases we will 
have much better visual results using our 
scheme. Moreover, the proposed MIW scheme  
 
Fig. 10 – Performance in terms of watermark capacity versus ROI size (% original image 
pixels). 
uses lossless compression technique to 
compress the information to be embedded in 
the medical image. The amount of 
compression that can be achieved is different 
for different ROIs and EHR. Therefore, the 
results given in Table 1, Table 2 and Fig. 10 
are without using the compression technique. 
In this regard, it should also be noted that if 
we consider the compression scheme, the 
watermarking payload of the proposed scheme 
will be higher.  
We also tested our proposed method for 
security analysis. The key used to encrypt the 
EHR data, is the first level of security in our 
proposed scheme. Without the proper 
encryption key the unintelligible EHR cannot 
be decrypted correctly. The secret prime key 
(integer) and the dispersion function used for 
dispersing the watermark bits in the 
embedding region, is the second security 
measure used in the method. As the watermark 
bits are not embedded sequentially in the 
medical image, so for correct watermark 
extraction the proper dispersion function and 
the secret prime key is needed. Even if an 
attacker correctly guesses the bitplane 
numbers, where the watermarks have been 
embedded, he/she cannot do much with that 
information. Assuming, an attacker correctly 
have guessed the bitplane numbers Bp+1 for 
inserting the first watermark and Bp for 
inserting the second watermark, respectively. 
The first watermark consists of encrypted 
EHR/DICOM metadata part, ROI information, 
Side information, INDX and DIC etc. The 
attacker has to know the proper order of in 
which these data are concatenated. Even if 
he/she knows the proper order of 
concatenation, the attacker has to know the 
key for encryption/decryption and the 
dispersion function along with the secret 
prime number used to scatter the watermark's 
bits. If the attacker changes one or more bits in 
the Bp and/or Bp+1 bit-planes, the extraction 
and verification algorithm can correctly detect 
it. If the attacker removes the whole bitplane 
Bp and/or Bp+1, the algorithm can detect it 
correctly. Furthermore, the proposed tamper 
localization procedure is based on selecting 9 
bits out of available 256 bits, generated by   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  15 
SHA-256 scheme. This selection of 9 bits 
makes the tamper localization technique 
secure in the sense, that the attacker has to 
know which 9 bits out of 256 bits are used.  
As mentioned earlier, our proposed method is 
fragile in nature. Therefore, any kind of 
alteration in the watermarked image, would 
destroy the hidden watermark and the 
proposed tamper localization scheme, would 
identify the tampered locations. Moreover, the 
proposed MIW scheme is secured against 
common fragile watermarking attacks, such as 
the copy or the collage attack. Two different 
watermarks are inserted in the medical images 
using the proposed method. Both of these two 
watermarks are image content dependent. As a 
result, for each different image different 
watermarks are embedded. The first 
watermark consists of the image content 
dependent image hash and the second 
watermark contains the image content 
dependent binary location map. Both the 
image hash and binary location map is 
different for different images. Hence, the  
 
Fig. 11 – Tamper localization (a) original watermarked image, (b) tampered watermarked 
image, (c) tampered region. (For interpretation of the references to color in text, the reader is 
referred to the web version of this article.) 
proposed method is secured against the 
common fragile watermark attacks. 
To demonstrate the efficiency of the novel 
tamper localization scheme, we changed the 
values of some pixels in an USG image. Fig. 
11 shows the result of the tamper localization 
experiment. The USG image shown in Fig. 
11(a) was watermarked with the proposed 
MIW technique. Fig. 11(b) shows the 
tampered watermarked image, in which the 
region containing a text ("BOY") was 
tampered. The tampered region was 
successfully detected as shown in Fig. 11(c). 
The proposed scheme marks the tampered 
regions with red colour. 
We have compared our proposed scheme with 
some of the state-of-the-art MIW techniques. 
The advantages/disadvantages of the 
compared method are tabulated in Table 3. 
The problem with the method proposed in [13] 
is that it embeds data in a mark image which is 
an image of hospital's mark (used to identify 
the origin of an EHR). No medical image is 
used in the scheme. Depending on the size of 
the mark image and the amount of data 
embedded, the proposed technique produces 
hidden image with low visual quality (PSNR 
33.57 dB). Acharya et al. have used the 
technique of [16] to interleave EHR and 
graphical signal (ECG) in the medical images. 
As mentioned in the Table 3, this method is of 
low watermark capacity, without reversibility 
and tamper localization capabilities. Even 
though the scheme uses encryption of EHR 
and graphical signals before interleaving, the 
system lacks the modern digital data security 
concerns. In [17],  only the hash (SHA-256) of 
the whole image is embedded in the RONI 
part of the image. The method depends on the 
size ROI. Moreover, the authors claim that 
their method is lossless, with the assumption 
that all the pixels in the RONI of all medical 
images are zeros. This assumption is not true 
for all the medical images and so the claim of 
the reversibility of the technique. Furthermore,   Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  16 
the method is not secured. The MIW scheme 
of [18] lacks the security measures needed in 
modern digital data management domain. The 
tamper detection procedure can easily be 
forged. The method of [21] uses a pre-
processing step for changing the pixel value of 
the original from the range 0 - 255 to 3 - 252. 
This pre-processing step makes the scheme a 
near-lossless technique. During tamper 
detection, the proposed scheme gives a block 
of size 256 x 256 as the tampered block. This 
limits the tamper localization accuracy. 
Moreover, the method is tested only for 
mammogram images. Its effect on other 
modalities of medical images is not 
experimented. The method proposed by Guo 
et al. in [22], is based on region of embedding 
(ROE) selection automatically or semi-
automatically. The watermark is embedded in 
ROE only. This restricts the watermark 
capacity. Moreover, two essential 
requirements of the proposed scheme are that 
the ROE should not intersect the ROI, and 
ROE should be in the smooth region (mostly 
background) of the image. This also reduces 
the applicability of the method. In [23] Guo et  
al. proposed an improved version of the 
method described in [22] with tamper 
localization capability. Apart from the 
shortcomings of the technique [22], the tamper 
localization procedure of [23] will fail if the 
tampering occurs in the ROE. The MIW 
scheme proposed by Nambakhsh et al. in [25] 
is based on secret key >= 13 bytes and tested 
on PET image only. This key needs to be 
stored separately and securely. It uses ECG 
signal and text image as watermarks. In the 
reconstructed 1D image, some characters are 
not completely extracted but are visually 
recognizable. Increase in the size of ECG also 
decreases the visual quality drastically (for 
512 bytes PSNR 50dB and for 4 kb PSNR 
27db). It is clear from the above mentioned 
discussion that most of the compared methods 
are task specific with low hiding capacity or 
imperceptibility etc. Moreover, most of the 
methods shown in the Table 3, lack one or 
more useful properties that are very much 
needed for a modern MIW system. In 
comparison to these compared MIW schemes, 
the advantages of our proposed technique can 
be listed as follows: 
1. The proposed method can be used as an all-
in-one solution tool having various 
applicability mentioned in Section 1.2. 
2. It works equally well for different 
modalities of medical images having different 
image format, bit-depths etc. 
3. Even though, we have used several tools 
such that SHA-256 for hashing, AES for 
encryption and arithmetic coding for lossless 
compression, it should be noted that these 
tools can easily be replaced by other advanced 
ones, without or with little modification to the 
proposed scheme. 
4. As the proposed technique is based on 
spatial domain, the time requirements of 
watermark insertion and watermark 
extraction/verification phases are very low. 
5. The proposed method has superior tamper 
localization capability of 3 × 3. 
6. The security concerns of the existing MIW 
scheme is overcome in the proposed technique 
through several layers of effective security 
measures. 
7. The proposed scheme has relatively higher 
embedding capacity and imperceptibility.   
The limitations of the proposed MIW 
technique are: the watermark payload is 
dependent on the size of the ROI. The 
proposed scheme is only ROI lossless. 
Moreover, the use of two separate bitplanes 
for watermark embedding, results in slightly 
higher degradation in the watermarked image 
(even though, the degradation is not visually 
significant). Moreover, the proposed scheme is 
not tested on colour medical images.  
5 Conclusions 
Digital watermarking has the potentiality of 
becoming an all-in-one solution tool to 
address various issues regarding effective 
medical information management and 
distribution. We have presented a blind, 
fragile watermarking scheme applied to 
medical images with good imperceptibility, 
high payload and enhanced security. Our 
scheme can be used for different modalities of 
medical images. It can be applied to a variety 
of digital medical images with different size, 
format, and bit-depth. The tamper localization    Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine XXX (2013) XXX‐XXX  17 
Table 3 - Performance comparison.
Scheme  Objectives  Hiding 
Capacity
ROI 
Based
Tamper 
Localization  Lossless  Blind 
Chao et al. 
[13] 
Authentication, 
integration and 
confidentiality of 
EHR. 
Relatively 
low  No  No  No  No 
Acharya et 
al. [16] 
EHR/graphic 
signal hiding 
Low, 
approximately 
0.125 bpp - 
0.25 bpp 
No  No  No  Yes 
Zain et al. 
[17] 
Authentication 
and integrity of 
DICOM images 
Only 
authentication 
data, no EPR
Yes  No  Near-
lossless  Yes 
Woo et al. 
[18] 
Authentication, 
data hiding 
Very low, 
only the 
border of the 
image is used 
for EHR 
hiding.  
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Wu et al. 
[21]  Authentication 
Low, only 
authentication 
data, no EPR.
Yes  Yes  Near-
lossless  Yes 
Guo et al. 
[22] 
Authentication, 
data hiding 
Theoretically 
0.75 bpp. 
However, the 
authors did 
not use the 
scheme for 
EPR hiding
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Guo et al. 
[23] 
Authentication, 
data hiding 
Theoretically 
0.75 bpp. 
However, the 
authors did 
not use the 
scheme for 
EPR hiding. 
Yes  Yes  ROI 
lossless  Yes 
Nambakhsh 
et al. [25] 
Authentication, 
EHR hiding (as 
image) 
Low, 
approximately 
0.25 bpp 
No  No  No  Yes 
Our method 
Authentication, 
integrity, data 
hiding 
0.89 bpp to 
0.39 bpp for 
ROI size of 
5% to 30% 
Yes  Yes  ROI 
lossless  Yes 
capability can successfully locate even a 
single tampered pixel and gives the 
corresponding 3 × 3 block as the tampered 
region. The experimental results indicate that 
the proposed scheme is feasible and given its 
relative simplicity, it can be applied to the 
medical images at the time of acquisition, to 
serve in many medical applications concerned 
with privacy protection, safety, effective 
archiving, efficient controlled access retrieval 
and management. 
6 Mode of availability of software 
The program is freely available (demo source 
code, test image files etc.) on request from the 
author. 
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